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The  paper  compares  different  views  on  technological  society  that  develop  the  
posthumanist position but avoid technological determinism or social constructiv-
ism. Special attention is given to the dichotomy between the concept of biopolitics  
(Foucault)  and the concept of  cosmopolitics  (Latour) in relation to the issues of  
plurality and hybridity.
What do we mean when we talk about technological society, information 
society or network society that are some of the most common attributes of 
globalization? Are these attributes supposed to change our view of what is 
society or what are technologies? Are they only new synonyms for descrip-
tion such as „post-industrial society“, „service society“, for the post - Ford-
ist concepts of the 21st Century capitalism and transnational empires? What 
does the emphasis on technology bring to the social, political and economic 
theories and processes? Do these concepts express anything new or import-
ant about the acceleration of technologies or about globalization?
The thesis of this paper is that the concept of the „technological society“ is 
only a symptom of the end of purely social, economical and political think-
ing. It is a symptom of the growing importance  of theories that are hybrid 
and interdisciplinary  in their  approach to social  and political  phenomena. 
Traditional  concepts such as politics, society and even family are becoming 
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increasingly obsolete  and a source of confusion rather  than description  or 
even  less  normativity.  In  the  present  complex  and  hybrid  situation  we 
should even avoid  such anthropocentric  concepts  for  a  similar  reason  for 
which we avoid concepts such as god or soul as being too theistic.
Politics is nothing purely social, cultural or political anymore, it involves 
a very complex relations to technology, sciences and different non-human 
actors. The same goes for technology and sciences and their close relations 
to the social, economic and political processes in our world. There is noth-
ing purely technological or scientific that is not already part of some politics 
or  economy.  As  Bruno  Latour  and  other  representatives  of  Science  and 
Technology Studies show us, we should stop seeing science and technology 
as something that happens in the laboratories while politics is happening in 
the public sphere. Not only because the laboratory is a social construction 
but more importantly because the whole world is becoming a laboratory in 
a non metaphorical sense. We live in the age of biopolitics, microbiopolitics, 
neuropolitics  and/or  cosmopolitics  and other  similar  attempts  that  brake 
down the divisions between culture and nature, politics and science/techno-
logy, fysis and techné. These new „politics“ are developing a non anthropo-
centric views of collectivity that form the key question in our discussion of 
technological society today.
WHAT IS THE BASE OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL
SOCIETY IF NOT TECHNOLOGICAL FAMILY? [1]
To show an example of what we mean by technological society and to ex-
plain our set of questions we will use one service on the Internet that ex-
plains the complexity of our situation better than any e-government project. 
The  site  called  “Donor  Siblings  Registry”  (http://www.donorsibling-re-
gistry.com) redefines the supposed base of our society and our identity - the 
idea and the ideal of a family. The site simply offers a service to mothers 
who conceive children with donated sperm to connect with one another, 
find the siblings of their children and create a new type of family. For ex-
ample, there are eleven women that conceived their children with the same 
man and find out about each other over this website, after which they star-
ted to meet together, celebrate birthdays and behave like an extended fam-
ily. This is not a polygamy nor promiscuity but a very simple example of 
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the modern marvels of reproductive science and database technologies. Wo-
men who undergo artificial  insemination simply put the number of their 
donor on the website and can easily track the brothers and sisters of their 
child. Are these kids actually brothers and sisters and can we use the word 
family for such a collective? In the biological sense they are, in the „social“ 
sense they become family when they start meeting each other and develop-
ing these “biological” relations. Nowadays, there are about 7000 registered 
users and some 2600 of them already created this new type of family in-
volving complex reproductive and database technologies. Not only half-sib-
lings and their mothers are using the website but lately also the donors are 
starting to come and look for their children out of curiosity or genuine in-
terest for their offspring.
This site is radically challenging our idea of a nuclear family as a norm 
and the base of society. It is creating something more like a multi nuclear 
family. We could even say that the reproductive technologies together with 
the Internet are bringing the paradoxical return of a very traditional form of 
large families or even of a type of polygamy without “real” men. How to 
speak of such families? Are these multi nuclear families social or technolo-
gical phenomenon? Are they a consequence of the human nature and our 
reproductive instincts? Are they a social phenomenon and expression of the 
socially constructed need for family or they are simply an outcome of the 
unnatural  possibilities  of nowadays technologies? Should we understand 
these hybrid collectives and families as a victory of the very traditional ideal 
of  a  large  family  or  a  promise  of  a  radically  new  future?  The  relations 
between humans and machines,  society and technology,  actually  always 
creates such hybrids that are difficult to categorize. They are hybrid collect-
ives, maybe even cyborg or posthuman collectives in which both sides are 
necessary conditions. Very similar challenges and problems we are facing in 
the case of this website are happening on a large scale in the case of todays 
technological society.
HYBRID AND PARADOXICAL
COLLECTIVES SINCE OLD GREECE [2]
How to speak of technological society or similar “technological” families 
and not fall prey to the lures of technological determinism, sociobiology, or 
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on the opposite side, of social constructivism? Can we really make a clear 
distinction today between social and political processes on one side, and sci-
entific and technological development on the other? What is then the differ-
ence between the seemingly clear biological process of evolution, political 
process of globalization and for example the cybernetic process of negen-
tropy? How are the movements and interactions of atoms different from the 
movements and interactions of cells and the movements and interactions of 
individuals, nations, institutions etc.? Are these “planes” of existence paral-
lel to each other or they are somehow interdependent and how? How to 
speak of a whole which contains so many different planes of existence?
There are many examples of discourses that answer to these questions 
and speak of the complex nature of the contemporary world in non-reduc-
tionists  terms  of  networks,  hybridity  and  plurality  instead  of  unity  and 
structure. They are considered contemporary, but it is surprising to see how 
they represent  one of  the most  traditional  idea of  what is  society which 
could be traced in Aristotle. In the second book on Politics Aristotle says 
that the „nature of a state is to be a plurality“ which is ruled by a mysteri-
ous „principle of compensation“. This original and somehow forgotten in-
sight by Aristotle is actually the motto of the contemporary reflexions on 
technological  society:  “Is  it  not  obvious that  a  state may at  length attain 
such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state? since the nature of a state is 
to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it be-
comes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may 
be said to be more than the state, and the individual than the family. So that 
we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be 
the destruction of the state.” (Aristotle 2006) It is also worth of mentioning 
how he imagines the interactions in this plurality. The plural unity is man-
ageable by what he calls the „principle of compensation“: “Wherefore the 
principle of compensation, as I have already remarked in the Ethics, is the 
salvation of states. Even among freemen and equals this is a principle which 
must be maintained, for they cannot an rule together, but must change at 
the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succes-
sion.” (Aristotle 2006)
The elements out of which a unity of a state is to be formed should be 
different in kind and they are ruled by principle of compensation. Even if 
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Aristotle does not say it explicitly, his idea is that every citizen has different 
interests and occupation. The contemporary views on plurality are in this 
respect more radical and they involve not only humans but also non - hu-
mans like animals and natural phenomena in the case of ecological politics 
or machines in the case of posthumanist views of society. Our main prob-
lem today with this plurality remains the same as in Aristotle time: we can 
not really rule together, but we have to find some order of succession, some 
“principle of compensation” so we do not risk tyranny.
THE POLITICS OF PLURALITY AND
HYBRIDITY BETWEEN HUMANS AND NON-HUMANS [3]
Today, there is a whole group of political thinkers that are trying to develop 
a new alternative to the liberal and the communitarian positions, between 
the emphasis on freedom and emphasis on community, by developing the 
idea  of  plurality.  This  strategy  could  be  summarized  under  the  maxim 
„community without unity” (commonality with difference) that is for ex-
ample the title of William Corletts book (Corlett 1989). Corlett or more not-
ably Jean-Luc Nancy (Nancy 2000) are both influenced by the deprecation of 
continental philosophy to reduce humans to some essential humanity, sub-
jectivity or rationality which in turn supposes an ideal society. Nancy per-
ceives society as an interaction of what he calls singularities and absolute al-
terities that create networks, assemblages, which preserve their differences. 
These singularities and alterities actually become even stronger when they 
are part of the assemblages, they are never reduced to a common ground. 
To express this non-unity, this plural unity, Nancy uses paradoxical expres-
sions such as being singular plural etc.. In his view, all existence is essen-
tially plural co-existence and the plural singularity or singular plurality is in 
a constant flux and interaction. To emphasize this space of plural singularit-
ies and assemblages, Nancy but also for example Jacques Derrida (Derrida 
2002) brake down all traditional differences between man and god and even 
between man and animal. The plural unity and other types of paradoxical 
collectivity  simply  refuse  any  transcendental  position,  any  divisions 
between something “higher” and “lower”.
To summarize: contemporary society is described as an open space for 
hybrid identities or this is at least expected as a normative ideal. The men-
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tioned thinkers do not necessarily refer to technologies and to non-humans 
but they do use metaphors of hybridity and networks that are common in 
the  case  of  posthumanist  philosophies.  Other  theories  that  incorporate 
strong  notions  of  plurality  and  hybridity  like  “micropolitics”  (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1988) or “microbiopolitics” (Thrift 2003) refer to different ways in 
which “non-political” and “non - social” entities enter our social life like 
media, design, architecture, different techniques of self that are embodied in 
all  possible  cultural  rituals  and structures.  These  theories  are  sometimes 
called “postsocial” theories (Knorr Cetina 2001) for this reason. What serves 
as an example of hybridity in the case of postmodern and poststructural 
philosophy - the relation between man and animal or some strong concept 
of alterity, is in the case of the posthumanist and postsocial views translated 
into the relation between humans and non-humans, society and technology.
BIOPOLITICS VERSUS COSMOPOLITICS:
LEVIATHAN VERSUS VERTUMNUS [4]
Contemporary society as a technological  society is viewed explicitly  as a 
plural and hybrid collective of humans and non-humans by thinkers such 
as Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, Daniel Dennett etc.. The concept of cos-
mopolitics that is used extensively by Bruno Latour (Latour 1993, 2004) is 
maybe best example of this tendency. Technology and sciences in Latour`s 
view domestice new entities in our world and open it to the heterogeneity 
and plurality of different new actors. We are always simply a part of com-
plex and emergent networks that involve both human and non-human act-
ors. Their interactions are complex and emergent so the new networks they 
create are neither purely social nor biological but hybrid. To describe these 
interactions between humans and non-humans Latour sometimes uses very 
strange terms such as “collective experiments”, “cosmograms”, “progress-
ive compositions”, “provisional assemblies”, “versions of collectives”, “par-
liament of things” (Latour 2004) etc.
This  postsocial  and  posthumanist  view  of  hybrid  collectivity  is  not 
shared by one of  the  most  important  theorist  of  contemporary  society - 
Michel Foucault. Foucault sees the technological society more as a threat to 
plurality and heterogeneity than an extension (Foucault 1978). New techno-
logies and sciences destroy the political life and create what he calls biopol-
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itics. It is basically a homogenization of the social beings into a biological 
specie by means of science and technology. The end of the political and the 
social is the end of plurality in this view. Science and technology simply re-
duce the complex and plural nature of human and social life into biological 
issues of survival, health, politics of population and birth rate, what Fou-
cault calls the „normalized society“ (Foucault 2003).
How did these authors came to such different conclusions when study-
ing the relation between technology and society? How to perceive the tech-
nological  society? Does it  bring a dangerous unity of the new biological 
meta-specie, as described by Foucault, or is it a society of hybrids and even 
cyborgs as is often described by posthumanist thinkers such as Donna Har-
away (Haraway 1992, 1997), Bruno Latour but also Daniel Dennett (Dennett 
1993, 1996)? To understand these opposite views on the technological soci-
ety we will use the visual metaphors of the title page of Hobbes`Leviathan 
and the painting of Vertumnus by Arcimboldo. They represent the anthro-
pocentric and non-anthropocentric views of the collectivity that are the key 
issue in the discussion on the technological society.
Leviathan is the most famous illustration of the relation between the indi-
vidual and the social - political whole. The numbers of people create one big 
anthropocentric  or rather anthropomorphic  whole, the body of the new sov-
ereign which fits perfectly  into what Foucault's calls biopolitics. People are 
reduced to the cells  of the new organism and all plurality  serves to create 
this new homogeneous unity. A very different example of how to perceive 
not only the social and political whole but also the individual is the famous 
painting  of  Rudolf  II.  by  Arcimboldo.  Vertumnus  offers  a  non-anthropo-
centric view not only of the whole but also of the individual. The sovereign 
and even the human is reduced to a cycle of vegetables,  which were sup-
posed to depict the twelve signs of the zodiac, four seasons and the veget-
ables from different countries where Rudolf II. ruled. In the traditional inter-
pretation he is the microcosm that represents  the macrocosm  but from our 
view what  is  more  important  is  that  he represents  an emergent  whole  in 
which the original elements are not the same as the outcome. Arcimboldos` 
paintings offer a great examples of cosmopolitics  and illustrate the posthu-
manist view of society and the individual. The painting “Librarian”  is almost 
a literal translation of the famous quote by Daniel C. Dennett: “A scholar is 
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just a library's way of making another library” (Dennett 1993: 204).
How to speak of the technological society from this non-anthropocentric 
perspective? Should we use the same rhetoric that Dennett uses when he 
speaks of libraries? We can not seriously think that we are here because the 
libraries need to reproduce but there is not more certainty in thinking that 
that libraries exist only because of humans. The complex new lifeforms and 
collectives like scholars, libraries or our body can not be reduced to one act-
or and one essence. We do not have any idea what our cells thinks of our 
bodies not we can be completely certain how our thinking and doing affects 
the larger wholes that we are part of like our cities or states. Technological 
society is an emerging whole created by the relations between humans and 
non-humans that have a great potential to reshape the world. Maybe the 
closest what we can say about this emergent whole is paraphrase of another 
Dennett`s bon mot: Are we a society or a technology, humans or machines, 
or both? We are both and more (Am I organism or a community of both? I 
am both and more: Dennett 1996: 457).
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